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INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES ON THE INTERNET: FEDERAL
ELECTION LAW AND POLITICAL SPEECH ON THE WORLD
WIDE WEB
Ryan Z. Watts
The internet is as beneficial as it is trouble-
some. It provides a single person the opportunity
to reach millions, circumventing such traditional
gatekeepers as book and newspaper publishers.'
However, the same medium provides opportuni-
ties for individuals to mistreat its general freedom
of communication and widespread availability of
information.2 The internet also creates problems
when courts, lawmakers and regulators impose
antiquated laws and policies on the new medium.
3
In one of the most recent issues to arise, the regu-
lator is the Federal Election Commission and the
antiquated law is the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.
4
The Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or
"Commission") received a complaint May 4, 1999,
asking it to apply a 27-year-old statute5 to an in-
ternet site. 6 The site, a satirical criticism of Repub-
See Bruce W. Sandford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching
an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World,
28 CONN. L. REv., 1137, 1141-42 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Lydia Adetunji, U.S. Representatives Consider Fed-
eral Laws on Cyberstalking, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 30, 1999,
at A13.
3 See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,
1227-28 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that an individual's use of
the federally registered "Intermatic" trademark as an internet
domain name violated the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
and the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act).
4 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-
225, 86 Stat. 11 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 et seq. (1994)).
5 See id.
6 See Letter from Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Counsel, Gover-
nor George W. Bush for President Exploratory Committee,
Inc., to Lawrence M. Noble, Esq., General Counsel, Federal
Election Commission (May 3, 1999) available at
<www.gwbush.com/meanbush.htm> (complaint against Zack
Exley and www.gwbush.com) [hereinafter Exley Complaint].
7 See Letter from Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Counsel, Gover-
nor George W. Bush for President Exploratory Committee,
Inc., to Zack Exley, owner, gwbush.com (Apr. 14, 1999) avail-
able at <www.gwbush.com/litigiousbush.htm> (cease and de-
sist letter). On October 18, 1999, the Bush campaign substan-
lican presidential candidate George W. Bush, al-
legedly violated a number of federal election
regulations. The Governor George W. Bush for
President Exploratory Committee, Inc. ("Explora-
tory Committee") found the website particularly
offensive because the site's appearance and do-
main name-www.gwbush.com-closely resemble
those of the Exploratory Committee's website at
www.georgewbush.com. 7
The issue goes beyond the Bush campaign's dis-
taste for the satire; under the rules of the FEC,
anyone who expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a clearly defined candidate on a per-
sonal internet site and does not disclose expendi-
ture information could be in violation of federal
election law.8 In addition to the complaint, the
Bush campaign requested that the Commission is-
sue an advisory opinion clarifying a number of is-
tially changed the interface of www.georgewbush.com,
distinguishing it from www.gwbush.com. See Governor Bush
Unveils Innovative New Website (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<www.georgewbush.com/News/1999/october/.
pr101899_web.asp>.
8 See 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (1999) (requiring a financed
communication expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate to include a disclaimer giv-
ing the reader notice of the identity of the persons who paid
for or authorized the communication); 11 C.F.R.
§ 104.4(c)(1) (1999) (requiring political committees to file
disclosure reports with the FEC and the Secretary of State
where the expenditure is made if the expenditure is in sup-
port or opposition to a candidate for President of the United
States); 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a) (1999) (requiring "[e]very per-
son other than a political committee, who makes independ-
ent expenditures aggregating in excess of $250 during a cal-
endar year" to file a disclosure report with the FEC); 11
C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (1999) (defining as a political committee
any association or group which receives contributions or
makes expenditures exceeding $1,000); Advisory Opinion
1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411
(1998) (finding that a web page expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate requires disclosure as an
independent expenditure or a political committee).
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sues regarding the internet and campaign disclo-
sure laws. 9 The Bush campaign asked how to
assess the value of a website created by volunteers
or persons unaffiliated with the campaign.' 0 Addi-
tionally, the Bush campaign asked for guidance
concerning Commission regulations of internet
vending," internet polls, 12 the use of email by
committee volunteers13 and issues regarding the
solicitation of contributions through the in-
ternet.1
4
The FEC issued a Notice of Inquiy ("NOI") seek-
ing comment on internet campaign activity and
the questions posed by the Bush campaign. 5 The
notice focused on the concerns of campaign com-
mittees and how the internet activity may trigger
contribution disclosure laws. 16 In addition, the
Commission asked for comment on how the FEC
should determine the value of a website.'
7
Disclosure requirements are part of a broad set
of regulations governing election law. Modern
9 See Draft Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 1 (1999).
10 See id. In a draft advisory opinion, FEC staff noted that
activity by volunteers using personal property, including per-
sonal computers, does not constitute a contribution under
section 100.7(b) (4) of the Commission's rules. See id. at 5-6.
The use of corporate facilities is allowable under section
114.9(a) of the Commission's rules if the use is occasional,
isolated or incidental and does not increase the operating
costs of the corporation. See id. The FEC staff also tentatively
concluded that websites created by individuals unaffiliated
with the campaign are not contributions if the individual
constructed the website completely independent of the com-
mittee's control. See id. at 6-7. However, the FEC staff ac-
knowledged that such a website would constitute an in-
dependent expenditure if the costs exceed $250 during a
calendar year. See Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 7 (1999).
11 See Draft Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 2.
12 See id.
13 See id. at 3.
14 See id. at 4.
15 See Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, Notice of
Inquiry and Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 60360, 60361
(1999).
16 See id. at 60361, 60363.
17 See id. at 60362.
18 Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994)).
1' See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1975), affd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding
many of the FECA's contribution limitations constitutionally
valid under the First Amendment).
20 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
21 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 193 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e) (1) (repealed XXXX)). In the original Act, section
608(e) (1) read,
No person may make any expenditure (other than an
expenditure made by or on behalf of a candidate within
the meaning of subsection (c) (2) (B)) relative to a
election law originated with the enactment of the
Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") of 1971,
which Congress substantially amended in 1974.18
The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia noted that the FECA was "by far
the most comprehensive reform legislation passed
by Congress concerning the election of the Presi-
dent, Vice-President, and members of Con-
gress."'19 The FECA's primary purpose was to
"limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contribu-
tions[.]"20 Among the restrictions, the FECA im-
posed limits on expenditures by political commit-
tees and individuals 21 and required the disclosure
of contributions and expenditures by candidates,
political committees and individuals.
22
This comment will first discuss important
Supreme Court decisions that have shaped FEC
implementation of the Act. Second, it will ex-
amine FEC policy concerning the internet, con-
clearly identified candidate during a calendar year
which, when added to all other expenditures made by
such person during the year advocating the election or
defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1000.
Id.
22 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 154 (construing 2 U.S.C. § 434).
Prior to Buckley, section 434(e) read,
Every person (other than a political committee or candi-
date) who makes contributions or expenditures, other
than by contribution to a aggregate amount in excess of
$100 within a calendar year shall file with the Commis-
sion a statement containing the information required by
this section. Statements required by this subsection shall
be filed on the dates on which reports by political com-
mittees are filed by need not be cumulative.
2 U.S.C. § 434(e). The current provision imposing disclosure
reads,
Every person (other than a political committee) who
makes independent expenditures in an aggregate
amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar
year shall file a statement containing the information re-
quired under subsection (b) (3) (A) of this section for all
contributions received by such person. (2) Statements
required to be filed by this subsection shall be filed in
accordance with subsection (a)(2) of this section, and
shall include-(A) the information required by subsec-
tion (b) (6) (B) (iii) of this section, indicating whether
the independent expenditure is in support of, or in op-
position to, the candidate involved; (B) under penalty of
perury, a certification whether or not such independent
expenditure is made in cooperation, consultation, or
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, any can-
didate or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate; and (C) the identification of each person
who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person
filing such statement which was made for the purpose of
furthering an independent expenditure.
2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994).
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centrating on how the Commission calculates ex-
penditures. Third, it will discuss the matter
pending before the FEC concerning internet dis-
closure rules.23 Finally, this comment concludes
that the FEC should carve a narrow exemption for
the costs of creating an independent website for
advocacy purposes.
I. BUCKLEY V VALEO: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In a landmark decision dealing with a number
of latent issues in the FECA, the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo&4 confronted two issues relevant
to independent expenditures on the internet.
25
First, the Court distinguished contributions from
expenditures, holding that while a limitation on
individual contributions to a federal campaign
passes First Amendment scrutiny, financial limita-
tions on expenditures unconstitutionally restrain
political speech. 26 The court stated, "A [financial]
contribution serves as a general expression of sup-
port for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the sup-
port."2 7 However, limitations on expenditures by
individuals and groups "impose direct and sub-
stantial restraints on the quantity of political
speech.'"28 Second, the Court held that expendi-
ture disclosure requirements comport with the
First Amendment because they allow public re-
view of information concerning the source of
campaign expenditures, deter corruption and
provide a means to detect violations of contribu-
tion limitations.
29
A. Limitations on Expenditures
The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the
23 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
24 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
25 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22, 66-68.
26 See id. at 20-21.
27 Id. at 21.
28 Id. at 39.
29 See id. at 66-68.
30 See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 897.
31 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
32 Id.
33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-16; Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.
The circuit court relied on the standard set forth in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). In O'Brien, the
Supreme Court validated a federal law against burning draft
cards, holding that when "speech" and "non-speech" ele-
ments exist, a sufficiently important government interest jus-
United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that these sections of the Act and
others pass First Amendment scrutiny.30 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court evoked strong First
Amendment principles in confronting the FECA's
limitations on expenditures. 31 The Court stated,
"The Act's contribution and expenditure limita-
tions operate in an area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities. Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candi-
dates are integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution. 32
The Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit
court's view that expenditure limitations regu-
lated conduct and not speech. 33 The Supreme
Court found limitations on expenditures particu-
larly offensive to the First Amendment and recog-
nized the importance of expensive mass media as
tools through which citizens may reach an increas-
ingly large audience. 34 The Court noted,
A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expres-
sion by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached... The electorate's increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and
information has made these expensive modes of com-
munication indispensable instruments of effective polit-
ical speech.35
The quantitative restriction, which entailed a
maximum fine of $25,000 and imprisonment for
not more than one year,36 triggered strict scrutiny
to determine "whether the language of section
608(e)(1) affords the '[p] recision of regulation
[that] must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.' "37
The Court found the statute's language limiting
"any expenditure ...relative to a clearly identi-
tifles limitations on First Amendment freedoms. See id. at
376-377.
-4 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
35 Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court
analogized political speech to driving a car: "Being free to
engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling
on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as
far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline."
Id. at 19 n.18.
36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 187 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 608(i)
(repealed XXXX)). Section 608(i) read, "Any person who vi-
olates any provision of this section shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both." Id.
37 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
20001
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
fled candidate"38 unconstitutionally vague on its
face.3 ' The Court concluded that the statute's use
of the word "relative" must be interpreted as ex-
press advocacy for a "clearly identified candi-
date." 40 The Court listed "magic words" that, if
used, would fall under section 608(e) (1). This list
included "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your
ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against,"
"defeat" and "reject."4' However, after reining in
the vague language of the statute, the Court
found the ceiling on independent expenditures
unconstitutional, reasoning that candidate advo-
cacy deserves as much protection as issue advo-




In the same opinion, the Court contrasted this
speech-protective language by upholding a limita-
tion on the amount an individual, partnership,
committee, association or corporation may con-
tribute to a federal candidate. 43 Section 608(b) (1)
of the FECA stated that "no person shall make
contributions to any candidate with respect to any
election for Federal office which, in the aggre-
gate, exceed $1000." 4 4 Borrowing the standard set
by previous cases on associational freedoms,4 5 the
Court said "[e]ven a 'significant interference'
with protected rights of political association' may
be sustained if the State demonstrates a suffi-
ciently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms."46 The Court cited three
government interests furthered by the limitation
38 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 193 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e)(1) (repealed XXXX)).
:'9 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 44 n.52. But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857,
864 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that speech may be express
advocacy without using the words listed by the Court in Buck-
ley). The Ninth Circuit said the speech "must, when read as a
whole, and with limited reference to external events, be sus-
ceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an ex-
hortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at
864. The Court noted that speech can be "express" even
though it is ambiguous. See id. Also, "advocacy" necessitates a
plea for action. See id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit said it must
be clear what action is advocated. See id.
42 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48.
43 See id. at 35.
44 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 188 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(b) (1) (repealed XXXX)).
45 See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491-92
that would validate the section. First, it noted that
limitations on contributions prevent real and per-
ceived corruption through large financial contri-
butions. 47 Second, by limiting the influence of the
affluent, more citizens may play a larger role in
affecting the outcome of elections.,4 8 Third, such
limitations may serve to suppress the exponen-
tially increasing cost of running for office.
49
C. Disclosure Requirements
Similarly, the Court upheld the FECA's expen-
diture reporting and disclosure requirements.
5 0
Section 434(e) of the Act originally read,
Every person (other than a political committee or can-
didate) who makes contributions or expenditures,
other than by contribution to a political committee or
candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $100
within a calendar year shall file with the Commission a
statement containing the information required by this
section. Statements required by this subsection shall be
filed on the date on which reports by political commit-
tees are filed but need not be cumulative. 
5
The Court held that disclosure requirements for
political committees pass First Amendment scru-
tiny.
52
Again, the Court used a strict scrutiny standard
to test the disclosure provision in section 434(e).
The Court said, "The provision is responsive to
the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as
they had been in the past, to avoid the disclosure
requirements by routing financial support of can-
didates through avenues not explicitly covered by
the general provisions of the Act. -5 3 Originally,
under the Act, expenditure was defined as
(1) .. .a purchase, payment, distribution, anything of
(1975) (holding that the Circuit Court erred in issuing an
injunction that abrogated the National Democratic Party's se-
lection of delegates for its convention).
40 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting Cousins, 419 U.S. at
488).
47 See id. at 25-26.
48 See id. at 26.
49 See id. at 26.
51 See id. at 61.
51 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160 (construing 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(e)). The current applicable section is 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(c). Section 434(c) reads, "Every person (other than a
political committee) who makes independent expenditures
in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a
calendar year shall file a statement containing the informa-
tion required under subsection (b) (3) (A) of this section for
all contribution received by such person." 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)
(1994).
52 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84.
5. Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
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value, made for the purpose of (A) influencing the
nomination for election, or the election, of any person
to Federal office, or to the office of presidential and
vice presidential elector; or (B) influencing the results
of a primary election held for the selection of delegates
to a national nominating convention of a political party
or for the expression of a preference for the nomina-
tion of persons for election to the office of President of
the United States; (2) ... a contract, promise, or agree-
ment, express or implied, whether or not legally en-
forceable, to make any expenditure; (3) ... the transfer
of funds by a political committee to another political
committee.
54
Among its many exceptions, 55 section 431 (f) ex-
empted "any communication by any person which
is not made for the purpose of influencing the
nomination for election, or election, of any per-
son to [flederal office.
'"56
First, the Court addressed the vague language
in section 431 (f) defining an expenditure as the
use of money or assets "for the purpose of...
influencing" an election. 57 Worried that the lan-
guage of section 431(f) would encompass issue
advocacy, the Court concluded that communica-
tion must be "express advocacy" 58 to fall under
the definition of expenditure in section 431(f).59
The Court reasoned that the disclosure require-
ment, narrowly construed, constitutes "a reason-
able and minimally restrictive method of further-
ing First Amendment values by opening the basic
processes of our federal election system to public
view."
60
Summarizing its holding, the Court said indi-
viduals and groups not acting as political commit-
tees must comply with the reporting requirements
under section 434 (e) "(1) when they make contri-
butions earmarked for political purposes or au-
54 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 147-48 (construing 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (1)-(3)).
55 Originally, section 431 (f) included an exemption for
the press. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (A). Other exemptions in-
clude nonpartisan "get out the vote" activity, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (4) (B), communications to stockholders or members
of organizations, see 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (C), the use of real
or personal property that does not exceed $500 or candidate
travel expenses that do not exceed $500, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (4) (D)-(E), costs incurred by a state or local polit-
ical party for printing lists of three or more candidates, see 2
U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (G), and payments by corporations or la-
bor organizations that are not expenditures under 18 U.S.C.
§ 610, see 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f)(4)(H). The current exceptions to
the definition of "expenditure" are codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(9) (B). In addition to these exceptions, the current list
of exceptions to "expenditure" include costs incurred by an
authorized committee or candidate while soliciting contribu-
tions. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (B) (vi). Limited legal and ac-
counting services are not expenditures. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (9) (B) (vii). Also, ballot access payments transferred to
thorized or requested by a candidate or his agent,
to some person other than a candidate or political
committee, and (2) when they make expenditures
for communications that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date." 61
II. FEC V MASSACHUSE7TS CITIZENS FOR
LIFE: BURDENSOME DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
In 1986, the Supreme Court revisited the Buck-
ley court's finding that disclosure requirements
comport with the First Amendment. 62 In FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court found un-
constitutional the disclosure requirements for cer-
tain corporations. 63 The Court reasoned that the
extensive disclosure requirements of section
441 (b) (2) unconstitutionally burdened a closely
held corporation created for the purpose of issue
advocacy.64
Massachusetts Citizens for Life was a nonprofit,
non-stock corporation. Its purpose was "to foster
respect for human life and to defend the right to
life of all human beings, born and unborn,
through educational, political and other forms of
activities [.] "65 The corporation acquired re-
sources through donations from "members" and
fund-raising events.66 Massachusetts Citizens for
Life irregularly published a newsletter containing
information on legislative activity and court deci-
sions. It was a tool to recruit volunteers, and it
usually urged readers to contact government offi-
cials to express their views.
67
another political party's committee or state official are not
expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9) (B) (x).
56 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (F) (construed in Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 149).
57 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (4) (F)).
58 See id. at 44 n.52.
59 See id. at 80.
60 Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). But see Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1945) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance
requiring all handbills to contain the name of the printer,
author or manufacturer and the name of the distributor).
61 Id. at 80.
62 See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 478 U.S. 238,
264-65 (1986).
63 See id. at 264-65.
64 See id. at 263-64 (construing 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (2)).
65 Id. at 241-42.




Before the 1978 primary elections, Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life published a "Special Edi-
tion" of its newsletter with the headline, "Every-
thing you need to know to vote pro-life." 6 The
newsletter listed candidates and indicated the or-
ganization's approval or disapproval of the candi-
dates' voting record on three issues.69 Addition-
ally, the newsletter published the pictures of
candidates who had a 100 percent approval rating
from Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 70
A. Expanding "Express Advocacy"
The Supreme Court found that the "Special
Edition" constituted an expenditure under sec-
tion 441b(b)(2). That section reads, "The term
'contribution or expenditure' shall include any
direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, ad-
vance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services,
or anything of value . . . to any candidate, cam-
paign committee, or political party or organiza-
tion in this section . . ."71 The Court acknowl-
edged that the newsletter must constitute "express
advocacy" to fall under the definition of section
441b(b) (2).72 Although the publication did not
contain the "magic words" listed in Buckley v.
Valeo,7 3 the Court held that the newsletter ex-
pressly advocated the election of the named can-
didates because the newsletter's essential nature
was to advocate for the election of pro-life candi-
dates.74 The Court argued that the newsletter con-
stituted "express advocacy" because it provided
names and photographs of candidates with "an
explicit directive: vote for these (named) candi-
dates."
75
B. The Press Exemption
Additionally, the Court rejected Massachusetts
68 See Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 478 U.S. at 243.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 243-44.
71 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2) (1994).
72 See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249 (rely-
ing on Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80, which required "express advo-
cacy" in order to distinguish and protect issue advocacy from
expenditures advocating the election of a candidate for fed-
eral office).
73 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
74 See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249-50.
75 See id. at 249-50.
76 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9) (B) (i) (1994). The exemption was
designed to clarify
that it is not the intent of Congress in the present legisla-
Citizens for Life's claim that the newsletter fell
under the press exemption under 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (9) (B) (i). Section 431 (9) (B) (I) reads, "The
term 'expenditure' does not include, any news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publica-
tion, unless such facilities are owned or controlled
by any political party, political committee, or can-
didate. '7 6 The Court reasoned that even if the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life newsletter were ex-
empt, the "Special Edition" does not benefit from
the exemption because it differed substantially
from the previous newsletters. 77 The organization
used a different staff to publish the "Special Edi-
tion," it was distributed on a grander scale and to
readers unaffiliated with the organization, the
publication contained no volume or issue number
and it did not bear the Massachusetts Citizens for
Life masthead .7 The Court defended this finding
against the objection of Massachusetts Citizens for
Life by arguing that "it is precisely such factors
that in combinatiori permit the distinction of
campaign flyers fro'rn regular publications.
'" 79
C. Disclosures Offending the First
Amendment-Carving a Narrow Exception
However, after determining that the Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life newsletter fell under section
441(b) (2), the Court held that the disclosure re-
quirements imposed upon the corporation vio-
lated the First Amendment as applied to Massa-
chusetts Citizens for Life."" Because Massachusetts
Citizens for Life was a corporation, it had to cre-
ate a "separate segregated fund" to use for ex-
penditures advocating the election of candidates
for federal office.8'
The act of creating this fund would place the
tion to limit or burden in any way the [sic] First Amend-
ment freedoms of the press or of association. [The ex-
emption] assures the unfettered right of the newspaper,
TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on
political campaigns.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 250. (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974)).
77 See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 250-51.
78 See id. at 250-51.
79 See id. at 251.
80 See id. at 264-65.
S See id. at 253 (citing sections 441b(a) and
441 (b) (2) (c), the Court said, "Because it is incorporated ...
Massachusetts Citizens For Life must establish a 'separate seg-
regated fund' if it wishes to engage in any independent
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organization under the definition of a "political
committee" under section 431 (4) (B). A political
committee must comply with all the disclosure re-
quirements of section 434(c) imposed upon indi-
viduals who spend over $250. These disclosure re-
quirements include "the identification of each
person who makes a contribution . . . during the
reporting period, whose contribution or contribu-
tions have an aggregate amount or value in excess
of $200 within the calendar year . . ."82 Section
434(c) (2) (A) requires that the disclosure include
the name and address of each ... person who receives
any disbursement during the reporting period in an ag-
gregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the
calendar year ... together with the date, amount, and
purpose of any such independent expenditure and a
statement which indicates whether such independent
expenditure is in support of, or in opposition to, a can-
didate ... 83
Also, the report must include "the identification
of each person who made a contribution in excess
of $200 to the person filing such statement which
was made for the purpose of furthering an in-
dependent expenditure.
'"8 4
In addition to these disclosure requirements, a
committee must comply with other procedural re-
quirements set forth in section 432. Under section
432(a), "[e]very political committee shall have a
treasurer. '85 The treasurer must a keep a record
of the people and organizations that contribute to
the committee, including a detailed accounting of
the amount contributed.8 6 In addition, the treas-
urer must "preserve all records required to be
kept by this section and copies of all reports re-
quired to be filed by this subchapter for three
years after the report is filed."
8 7
spending whatsoever."); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a), 441b(b) (2) (C)
(1994). Section 441b(b) reads,
For the purposes of this section . . . the term 'contribu-
tion or expenditure' ... shall not include .... (C) the
establishment, administration, and solicitation of contri-
butions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes by a corporation, labor organization,
membership organization, cooperative, or corporation
without capital stock.
Id.
82 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (3) (A) (1994).
83 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (6) (B) (iii).
84 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (2) (C).
85 2 U.S.C. § 432(a) (1994).
86 2 U.S.C. § 432(c). The committee treasurer must
keep an account of, (1) all contributions received by or
on behalf of such political committee; (2) the name and
address of any person who makes any contribution in ex-
cess of $50, together with the date and amount of such
contribution by any person; (3) the identification of any
Political committees under section 441b(b)
must register with the FEC by filing, "a statement
of organization no later than 10 days after estab-
lishment." 8 The statement must include
(1) the name, address, and type of committee; (2) the
name, address, relationship, and type of any connected
organization or affiliated committee; (3) the name, ad-
dress, and position of the custodian of books and ac-
counts of the committee; (4) the name and address of
the treasurer of the committee; (5) if the committee is
authorized by a candidate, the name, address, office
sought, and party affiliation of the candidate, and; (6) a
listing of all banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depos-
itories used by the committee.
8 9
A political committee must update any changes in
the required information, "no later than 10 days
after the date of the change."90 And "a political
committee may terminate only when such a com-
mittee files a written statement ... that it will no
longer receive any contributions or make any dis-
bursements and that such committee has no out-
standing debts or obligations."9'
Furthermore, during an election year, the poli-
cal committee must file quarterly reports and a
pre- and post-election report; during non-election
years it is required to file only every six months.
92
The Court digested the information political com-
mittees must file in these reports:
[T]hese reports must contain information regarding
the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of re-
ceipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identifi-
cation of each political committee and candidate's au-
thorized or affiliated committee making contributions,
and any persons making loans, providing rebates, re-
funds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to oper-
ating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200;
the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12
different categories; the names of all authorized or affil-
person who makes a contribution or contributions ag-
gregating more than $200 during a calendar year, to-
gether with the date and amount of any such contribu-
tion; (4) the identification of any political committee
which makes a contribution, together with the date and
amount of any such contribution; and (5) the name and
address of every person to whom any disbursement is
made, the date, amount, and purpose of the disburse-
ment, and the name of the candidate and the office
sought by the candidate, if any, for whom the disburse-
ment was made, including a receipt, invoice, or canceled
check for each disbursement in excess of $200.
2 U.S.C. § 432(d) (1994).
2 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1994).
2 U.S.C. § 433(b).
2 U.S.C. § 433(c).
2 U.S.C. § 433(d) (1).
See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (4) (A) (1994).
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iated committees to whom expenditures aggregating
over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan re-
payments or refunds have been made; the total sum of
all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding
debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the
retirement of any debt or obligation.
"9 3
The Court found this labyrinth of procedures and
disclosure requirements too burdensome for
small organizations like Massachusetts Citizens for
Life.
9 4
The Court acknowledged a substantial govern-
ment interest in compelling disclosure for corpo-
rate expenditures in political campaigns. 95 How-
ever, the Court reasoned that Massachusetts
Citizens for Life did not pose the evil of a large
corporation leveraging its power through capital-
fueled expenditures. 96 The Court noted, "The re-
sources it ha[d] available [were] not a function of
its success in the economic marketplace, but its
popularity in the political marketplace. '9 7 Unlike
stockholders or union members, those who con-
tribute to an organization like Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life understand they are funding a polit-
ical objective. 98 The Court limited its holding by
listing three distinguishing features of Massachu-
setts Citizens for Life that other organizations
must possess to claim immunity from section
441b:
First, it was formed tor the express purpose of promot-
ing political ideas, and cannot engage in business activi-
ties. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings.
Third .... [it] was not established by a business corpo-
ration or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept
contributions from such entities."9
Although the Court's holding in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life is limited to only a few organiza-
tions that bear these distinguishing features, the
implication of this holding opens the door for
similarly situated organizations or individuals.
93 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 253-54 (citing
2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1994)).
94 See id. at 254.
95 See id. at 259.
96 See id.
97 1(1.
98 See id. at 260--61.
99 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
100 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
101 See JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON
THIE INTERNET: FORMS AND ANALYSIS § 1.02[11] (1999).
102 See Jim Drinkard, E-Politics: How the Internet is Trans-
forming Grass-Roots Campaigns, One Click Can Reach Millions,
USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 1999, at Al.
103 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (1994). "The term 'expendi-
tire' includes-(i) any purchase, payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value,
Previously, the Court found that disclosure re-
quirements pose the least restrictive means to
achieve the substantial government interest in rid-
ding the election process of corruption.100 How-
ever, Massachusetts Citizens for Life creates an argu-
ment that disclosure requirements may violate the
First Amendment when they pose heavy adminis-
trative burdens.
III. THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO THE
INTERNET
The Massachusetts Citizens for Life decision di-
rected the Commission to proceed carefully with
disclosure requirements. However, at the time the
case was decided, the internet was merely a means
of communication among academic and govern-
ment research centers."'1 Just as television revolu-
tionized the way candidates campaign for office
and the means by which citizens become in-
formed about candidates and issues, the internet
stands to become a powerful tool for candidates
to reach voters. 1 2 The FEC has the challenge of
applying statutes crafted in the early 1970s to a
technology that has come of age in the 1990s. The
FEC's approach to internet activity as an expendi-
ture under section 431(9) (A)10 3 and its method
for calculating the expense of internet sites for
the purposes of sections 431 (4) (A) 104 and
434(c) 105 illustrate the problem of applying old
law to new technology.
In 1996, the FEC issued an advisory opinion
1 0 6
concerning an on-line "electronic town meeting"
organized by Bloomberg, L.P., a network that pro-
vides news and financial information via the in-
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any elec-
tion for Federal office; and (ii) a written contract, promise,
or agreement to make an expenditure." Id.
104 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994). "The term 'political
committee' means-(A) any committee, club, association, or
other group of persons which receives contributions aggre-
gating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." Id.
105 2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994).
I'6 The FEC is required to issue advisory opinions in re-
sponse to public requests for an interpretation of the elec-
tion laws. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 112.2, 112.4 (1999). These opin-
ions must gain the approval of a majority of the six-member
commission. See 11 C.F.R. § 112.4(a) (1999). In addition,
those requesting an advisory opinion and individuals who in-
tend to engage in activity indistinguishable from the matter
discussed may rely upon the advisory opinion in good faith.
See 11 C.F.R. § 112.5 (1999).
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ternet and other media."' 7 Candidates linked to
offices by two-way television would field questions
received though electronic mail.'08 Bloomberg
asked whether this activity would constitute a con-
tribution or expenditure under sections
431(8) (A) (i) and 431(9) (A) (i).109 Because
Bloomberg primarily "acts as a news and commen-
tary provider via computer linkages, performing a
newspaper or periodical publication function for
computer users," the FEC found that the elec-
tronic town meeting would fall under the press
exemption provided in section 431(9) (B) (i). 110
To support this finding, the Commission cited the
legislative history of the statute, which indicated
Congress's desire to exempt traditional media
from disclosure requirements."' The Commis-
sion said, "The use of audiences composed of
non-reporters, and subscribers and guests at com-
puter terminals, does not alter the basic nature of
this meeting either as a news event akin to a press
conference or as a form of commentary. '"112
Although the Bloomberg matter did not pose a
difficult problem for the FEC because the organi-
zation fit neatly into the characterization of a
press entity, the Commission has encountered
some difficulty computing internet expenditures
for non-press entities. For example, the Commis-
sion issued an advisory opinion in 1998 finding
that an independent website must satisfy the dis-
claimer requirements if it advocates the defeat of
a clearly identified federal candidate." 13 More sig-
nificantly, the FEC found such a website likely to
constitute an expenditure under section
431 (9).114 The individual who requested the advi-
sory opinion was the sole owner of Capital Ven-
tures Group, LLC, who created websites for non-
profit groups as part of its business. He created
the website in question to advocate the defeat of
107 See Advisory Opinion 1996-16, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6197, 12190.
108 See id.
109 See id. at 12191.
110 See id. at 12192.
111 See id. at 12191 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4
(1974)).
112 Id. at 12192 (citing Advisory Opinion 1982-44, Fed.
Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide Transfer Binder (CCH) 569, 10916.
113 See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12410.
114 See id. at 12411.
115 See id. at 12409.
116 See id. at 12411.
117 See id. at 12411 n.9.
118 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
Republican candidate Representative NancyJohn-
son in the Sixth Congressional District of Con-
necticut. 115 The Commission noted that websites
are not without cost, including the registration fee
for the domain name, the cost of the computer
hardware and the utility costs to create the site. 
1 16
In addition, the Commission acknowledged that
Capital Ventures Group creates websites as a busi-
ness and said the valuation of creating these sites,
minus the cost of voluntary personal services, rep-
resents the cost of the expenditure.' 17 Therefore,
it seems the FEC values a website at the rate a
company would bill a client for creating a site, mi-
nus the cost of labor.
V. WWW.GWBUSH.COM: POLITICAL
SATIRE AS A CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE
These issues came to a head when the Gover-
nor George W. Bush for President Exploratory
Committee, Inc. ("Exploratory Committee"), filed
a complaint with the FEC against a satirical web-
site aimed at the Republican presidential candi-
date.' 8 Zack Exley's <www.gwbush.com> website
uses a slightly altered masthead of the official
Bush website' 11 and satirizes Bush's policies on il-
legal drugs, crime and other issues. 120 The Ex-
ploratory Committee alleged that the site was in
violation of section 441d because it did not have a
disclaimer. 121 The Exploratory Committee also ar-
gued that Exley's website is an expenditure in ag-
gregate of $250, and therefore he must file an in-
dependent expenditure report required under
section 434(c) of the Act. Additionally, if Exley
has spent over $1,000 on the website during a cal-
endar year, he must register as a political commit-
tee under sections 431(4) (A) and 433 (a) of the
Act. 122
119 See George W. Bush for President Exploratory Com-
mittee Web Site (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.georgewbush.com>.
120 See Exley Complaint, supra note ???2.
121 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994). Section 441d requires,
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the pur-
pose of financing communication expressly advocating
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
.... (3) if not authorized by a candidate, an authorized
political committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall
clearly state the name of the person who paid for the
communication and state that the communication is not
authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.
Id.
122 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
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If the FEC applies these statutes consistent with
the case law and its advisory opinions, the Com-
mission is likely to find that Exley's website vio-
lates the FECA. First, by using Bush's name and
photograph, the website clearly identifies George
W. Bush. 123 In addition, the Exploratory Commit-
tee argues-and the FEC is likely to find-that
the site expressly advocates Bush's defeat.' 2 4 The
website does not show a disclaimer of any kind. In
fact, the site is designed to look like the Explora-
tory Committee's official website.125 For these rea-
sons, the FEC will likely find that Exley's website
violates section 441d of the Act.'
26
If the FEC uses the factors listed in Advisory
Opinion 1998-22 for computing the cost of an ex-
penditure over the internet, the Commission will
likely find that the cost of Exley's website exceeds
$250, requiring him to file an independent ex-
penditure report under section 109.2 of the Com-
mission's rules.12 7 In his answer to the Explora-
tory Committee's complaint, Exley claimed that
he had not spent over $250 on the website.' 28
However, Exley stated in his answer that because
the site has received so much traffic as a result of
the ensuing media blitz,' 29 the cost of maintain-
ing the site could increase exponentially through
his internet hosting service.
130
Additionally, the Exploratory Committee ar-
gues that the fair market value of the domain
name should be included in the cost of creating
the site. 3 1 Exley purchased the domain name
gwbush.com for $70, the Exploratory Committee
123 See gwbush.com (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.gwbush.com>.
124 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????. The complaint
alleges that the website contained the statement 'Just Say
'No' to a Former Cocaine User for President," which would
constitute express advocacy under Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44
n.52.
125 See gwbush.com (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.gwbush.com>. Compare George W. Bush for President
Exploratory Committee Web Site (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.georgewbush.com>.
126 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994).
127 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 (1999).
128 See Letter from Zack Exley, owner, gwbush.com, to
Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, Federal Election Com-
mission (June 7, 1999) available at www.gwbush.com/
metofec.htm (answer to complaint against Zack Exley and
www.gwbush.com) [hereinafter Exley Answer].
129 See, e.g., AndrewJ. Glass, Internet Domain Names Become
A Pain For Public Figures Campaign 2000, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Aug. 22, 1999, at All; Jessica Lee, Bill Would
Protect Trademarks, Names From Cybersquatters, USA TODAY, Aug.
3, 1999, at 8A; Hugh Aynesworth, Bush Sees No Humor In Web
Parody of Presidential Bid, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at C4;
rejected his offer to sell the site for $350,000.' 32
Therefore, if the FEC uses the broad cost assess-
ment announced in Advisory Opinion 1998-22,133
the cost of creating and maintaining the website
clearly goes beyond the $250 threshold in section
434 (c).
A. Filing for an Independent Expenditure
Should the Commission require Exley to com-
ply with section 434(c) of the Act, he must file a
written statement with the Secretary of State in
the state where the expenditure is made.'3 4 The
statement must include Exley's mailing address,
his occupation and the name of his employer.'
35
Exley also must disclose the amount of the expen-
diture.' 36 The filing must include a statement in-
dicating that the expenditure was in opposition to
Presidential candidate George W. Bush. 13 7 Addi-
tionally, the statement must be notarized and cer-
tified under penalty of perjury that the website
was created without the cooperation, consultation
or suggestion of any candidate or candidate's
committee. 38 Finally, the report must include the
name and address of each person who contrib-
uted more than $200 in furtherance of the crea-
tion of the website.139 Because Exley pays monthly
fees to maintain the website, during the 2000 elec-
tion year he must file a report by April 15,July 15,
October 15, and January 31 of the following
year.' 40 Additionally, Exley must file pre- and post-
election reports.'
4 '
Jonathan Weisman, Bush Campaign Busy Buying Up Net Real
Estate; Strategist for GOP Front-Runner is Hoping To Head Off An-
other Wicked Parody, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 19, 1999, at IA;
Wayne Slater, Bush Criticizes Web Site as Malicious, Owner Calls
It A Parody Of White House, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5,
1999, at 29A.
130 See Exley Answer, supra note ????. In a speech, George
W. Bush criticized the site and Exley, calling him a "garbage
man," and stated, "There ought to be limits to freedom."
Slater, supra note ????.
131 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
132 See Martha Brant, Pressing The Flesh Online: The Mouse
That Roars, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 50.
133 SeeAdvisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411 (1998).
134 See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.2, 104.4(c)(1) (1999).
135 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(i).
136 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(iii).
137 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(iv).
138 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(v).
139 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(vi).
140 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c)(1) (1999).
141 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c)(1)(ii-iii).
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B. Filing as a Political Committee
Finally, the Exploratory Committee alleges that
the website is an expenditure exceeding $1,000,
requiring Exley to register as a political commit-
tee under sections 431(4) (A) and 433(a) of the
Act. 142 For comparison, the reporting require-
ments for individual expenditures not exceeding
$250 include filling out a two-page form.143 If Ex-
ley must register as a political committee, the
form for disclosure is twenty-eight pages.
144
V. BREATHING SPACE FOR POLITICAL
ACTIVITY ON THE INTERNET
The matter concerning Zack Exley,
www.gwbush.com and Bush's Exploratory Com-
mittee shines a glaring spotlight on one of the
hidden problems of internet regulation. Federal
election regulations have not evaded the frustra-
tion caused by an interactive mass medium. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that regulations on
expenditures operate in an area of the most fun-
damental First Amendment activities. Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications
of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by the Constitu-
tion. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people."
14 5
The Court in Buckley held that disclosure re-
quirements present the least restrictive means by
which the government may rid federal elections
of corruption.' 46 However, these requirements be-
142 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
143 See, e.g., FEC Form 5 (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<www.fec.gov>.
144 See, e.g., FEC Form 3X (visited Sept. 20, 1999)
<www.fec.gov>.
145 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
146 See id. at 66-68.
147 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-710) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); see also LeonardJ. Kennedy & Lori A. Zallaps,
If It Ain't Broke... The FCC and Internet Regulation, 7 COM-
MLAW CONSPEcrus 24 (1999) (arguing that the FCC should
abstain from regulating internet technologies).
148 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (holding
that, under the First Amendment, a statute criminalizing the
internet transmission of obscene or indecent material to mi-
nors is overbroad).
149 See id. at 868 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
come larger barriers when compared to the rela-
tive ease of disseminating information via the in-
ternet. The burden on free speech created by
these disclosure requirements outweighs the po-
tential evil posed by internet communication.
Therefore, the FEC should not. impose disclosure
regulations on individual websites advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date.
The FEC should take direction from Congress's
policy of non-regulation of the internet. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress re-
moved the internet from the Federal Communica-
tion Commission's ancillary jurisdiction. Section
230 of the Act provides "it is the policy of the
United States... to preserve the vibrant and com-
petitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 147 Fur-
thermore, in Reno v. ACLU, the leading case on
the internet and First Amendment freedoms, the
Supreme Court distinguished the internet from
traditional media. 148 The Court said, " 'Each me-
dium of expression . . . may present its own
problems.' "149 Factors the Court previously ac-
knowledged in determining the nature of a me-
dium include the history of government regula-
tion of the medium,1 50 the scarce nature of the
medium 15 1 and the invasive qualities of the me-
dium.1 5 2 In Reno v. ACLU, the Court recognized
that these factors do not exist on the internet,
153
reinforcing the idea that government restrictions
should treat the internet as a completely separate
medium with a higher level of First Amendment
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
150 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (alteration in original); see
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391
(1978) (holding that the government's historical regulation
of the broadcast spectrum, among other factors, justifies a
lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny).
151 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; see also Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S 622, 637-638 (1994) (discussing
the scarce quality of broadcastingjustifying a reduced level of
First Amendment scrutiny for the curtailment of free
speech).
152 See id. at 868; see also Sable Communications of Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (granting te-
lephony services a higher degree of First Amendment protec-
tion compared to broadcast media, reasoning that
communication over a telephone wire is less invasive because
it requires the affirmative step of dialing phone numbers,
where a broadcast listener need only turn on a radio).





[Tihe Internet is fundamentally different from tradi-
tional forms of mass communication in at least three
important respects. First, the Internet is capable of
maintaining an unlimited number of information
sources, thereby eliminating traditional concerns about
"scarcity" that currently plague the broadcast media.
Second, the Internet has no "gatekeepers"-no pub-
lishers or editors controlling the distribution of infor-
mation. The Internet, therefore, facilitates decentraliza-
tion of the supply of information. Finally, the users of
Internet information are also its producers.1
55
These factors alone do not make a case for a
higher degree of First Amendment protection.
However, these factors, coupled with the political
content potentially at risk of suppression, present
a clear answer that prudence dictates a high de-
gree of protection for independent political activ-
ity on the internet.
Because Congress, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission and the courts have afforded
the internet a high level of protection against reg-
ulations that burden speech, 156 the FEC should
follow this example and create a "safe harbor" for
unfettered political speech on the internet. The
FEC can achieve this goal in one of two ways. First,
the Commission could carve out an exception
under section 109.2 of the Commission's rules,
which requires disclosure for individuals who
spend over $250 advocating the election or defeat
of a federal candidate. 15 7 Second, the FEC should
change its approach to calculating the cost of cre-
ating a website for the purposes of advocating the
election or defeat of a federal candidate.
58
A. Creating an Exemption
An exception to section 109.2 of the Commis-
sion's rules for individual internet expenditures
154 Cf Andrew Chin, Making the World Wide Web Safe for
Democracy: A Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis, 19 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 309, 330-32 (1997) (criticizing the Dis-
trict Court's decision in ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa. 1996)). Chin argues that to attain the optimal amount of
public discourse on the internet, government must impose a
"must-carry" rule for websites. See id. This rule would compel
popular sites to carry links to less popular websites. See id.
155 See Sandford & Lorenger, supra note ????, at 1141-42.
156 See FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Address
Before the Federal Communications Bar, Northern Califor-
nia Chapter, San Francisco, CA, The Unregulation of the In-
ternet: Laying a Competitive Course for the Future (July 20, 1999)
(noting that the FCC created a deregulatory environment for
the internet) available at <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
spwek924.html> .
would be analogous to the narrow exception cre-
ated by the Supreme Court in FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life.159 In that case, the Court recog-
nized that administrative costs associated with re-
gistration and disclosure requirements unconsti-
tutionally burden political speech when applied
to a small, non-profit organization.16 1 Similarly,
even the most simple disclosure requirements
under sections 109.2'61 and 104.4(c) (1) 162 of the
FEC's rules pose a heavy burden on political
speech over the internet. Because the internet has
the potential to diminish the gap between those
with political influence and those without the re-
sources to organize powerful political committees,
the FEC should take measures to make individual
political speech unfettered by election law regula-
tion and disclosure requirements. Commissioner
Karl Sandstrom, one of the six members of the
Federal Election Commission, said,
On the Internet, every woman and man is a potential
publisher. There is no class distinction between the
elite and the common person. The raw egalitarianism
of this new frontier appeals to the American spirit.
Here the hope lives that the force of an argument can
prevail over the might of the pocketbook. One need
only visit the web page of a sophisticated high school
student to see how slim a technical advantage media gi-
ants enjoy.
163
Imposing disclosure requirements will not
smother political speech on the internet, but it
will impose a formidable deterrent. As the Court
said in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,
"[w]hile the burden on [Massachusetts Citizens
for Life's] speech is not insurmountable, we can-
not permit it to be imposed without a constitu-
tionally adequate justification."' 164 Similarly, the
FEC should carve out an exemption to section
109.2 of the Commission's rules. The exception
would allow individuals, whose expenditures
157 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a) (1999).
158 See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411.
159 See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 263 (1986).
160 See id. at 263.
161 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 (1999).
162 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.4(c)(1) (1999).
163 See Karl Sandstrom .... And the Internet, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 1999, at B7 (asserting that the FEC should regulate
speech on the internet in a manner that will encourage par-
ticipation in public discourse. However, Sandstorm did not
pose any possible solutions or Commission action that would
further this goal.).
164 See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 478 U.S. at 263.
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would otherwise fall under sections 109.1165 and
109.2,166 to create internet sites that advocate the
election or defeat of a federal candidate.
The burden of disclosure for individual ex-
penditures on the internet is a modest assault on
the freedom of speech. However, the Supreme
Court said in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, "Our
pursuit of other governmental ends, however,
may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss
that would be unthinkable if inflicted all at once.
For this reason, we must be as vigilant against the
modest diminution of speech as we are against its
sweeping restriction."' 
67
B. Calculating the Cost of an Internet
Expenditure
Alternatively, the FEC could simply calculate
the amount of an internet expenditure differently
than its previous method laid out in Advisory
Opinion 1998-22.168 In that Advisory Opinion, the
Commission said that the cost of a website in-
cludes the registration fee for the domain name,
computer hardware and the utility costs to create
the site.' 69 Also, the Commission indicated that a
website's value may be the amount a web designer
charges a client less the cost of labor.' 7 1 The
FEC's method of computation for internet ex-
penditures is analogous to compelling an expen-
diture disclosure for creating a political bumper
sticker and adhering it to an automobile. For ex-
ample, an individual creates a single bumper
sticker advocating the election of a presidential
165 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.1 (1999). Section 109.1(a)-(b) (1)
defines an "independent expenditure" as
an expenditure by a person for a communication ex-
pressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is not made with the cooper-
ation or with the prior consent of, or in consultation
with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate or
any agent or authorized committee of such candidate.
(b) For purposes of this definition-(1) Person means
an individual, partnership, committee, association, quali-
fied nonprofit corporation under 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c),
or any organization or group of persons, including a sep-
arate segregated fund established by a labor organiza-
tion, corporation, or national bank (see part 114) but
does not mean a labor organization, corporation not
qualified under 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c), or national bank.
Id.
166 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2.
167 See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 478 U.S. at 264-65.
168 See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411 (1998).
169 See id.
170 See id. at n.9.
candidate. This expenditure does not require dis-
closure to the FEC under section 109.2 of the
Commission's rules because it does not exceed
$250.171 However, if the Commission included the
cost of the automobile in the total cost of the ex-
penditure, the cost of the bumper sticker would
easily exceed the $250 disclosure threshold. Fur-
thermore, if the value of the automobile exceeds
$1000, the owner would have to register and dis-
close as a political committee under sections
100.5(a) and 102.1(d) of the Commission's
rules.1 72 Like the automobile, computer hardware
and the utility costs associated with creating a web
page merely provide the mobility of the message,
not the message itself.
Including the cost of a computer's hardware al-
most certainly places expenditures involving the
internet well above $250. The FEC should ignore
these costs when computing expenditures on the
internet; the amount paid for the website's do-
main name should be the only relevant expendi-
ture. 173 Obtaining a domain name currently en-
tails a $70 registration fee for two years of
service. 7 4 The renewal fee is $35.175 This method
of computation would allow an individual to cre-
ate a web page advocating the election or defeat
of a federal candidate without breaking the $250
disclosure threshold in section 109.2176 or the
$1,000 threshold in section 100.5(a).
1 7 7
One could argue that the cost of a website
should include the cost of an internet service pro-
vider that acts as a gateway, or point of entry to
the internet. 78 However, this cost does not repre-
171 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2; see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(c).
172 See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(a), 102.1(d); see also 2 U.S.C
§§ 431 (4) (A), 433(a).
173 The domain name is the series of letters, numbers,
characters and periods (dots) assigned to computers con-
nected to the internet. See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at
§ 1.04[1] n.1 (1999).
174 See id, at § 2.03[1] n.5 (1999); see also Linda A. Gold-
stein, Advertising On The Internet: Laws and Regulations, 547
PLI/PAT 353, 356 (1999).
175 See MILLSTEIN, supra note101, at § 2.03[1] n.5; see also
Goldstein, supra note 174, at 356.
176 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2.
177 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a). "Except as provided in 11
C.F.R. 100.5(b), (c) and (d), any committee, club, associa-
tion, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year is a
political committee." 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a).
178 See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at § 1.04[1] (describ-
ing internet service providers as tools enabling "individuals to
reach the internet and proprietary networks through dial-up
phone service or through direct telecommunications connec-
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sent the cost of creating a website, because the
cost of an internet service provider implicitly in-
cludes costs for a bundle of different services. As
the name implies, an internet service provider
supplies not only a point of entry to the internet
but a number of services such as email and other
resources, 17 including the space to create a web-
site.' 80 Therefore, including the cost of an indi-
vidual's internet service provider overcompen-
sates for the actual cost of the website bearing the
advocacy for a federal candidate. Additionally,
once on the internet, an individual may obtain
space to construct a website free of charge.'I
However, it is important to distinguish internet
sites from advertising on the internet. Currently,
the FEC considers all communication on the in-
ternet to be advertising.1 8 2 In a 1995 Advisory
Opinion, the Commission said,
In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of
services available on the Internet, a sizable increase in
the number of persons using it, increased ease of acces-
sing the Internet, and a decline in the costs of hardware
and software needed to do so. The Commission con-
cludes that the combination of these factors means that
use of... World Wide Web site [s] ... should be viewed
as a form of general public political advertising under
11 C.F.R. § 110.11.18"
Although the FEC should exempt websites cre-
ated by individuals, it is important that the Com-
mission continue disclosure requirements for in-
dividuals or organizations that pay other website
operators to carry their message on the internet.
Otherwise, a full internet exemption would li-
cense powerful political committees to saturate
tions"). Millstein continues,
Internet service providers, in addition to furnishing ac-
cess to the internet, offer services such as website hosting
and design, and, once a party is online, e-mail and other
internet-based resources. [Internet Service Providers]
also may offer domain name-related services, including
domain name registration. They typically provide access
to the internet by means of telecommunications lines
which they own or lease from telecommunications carri-
ers.
Id.
179 See, e.g., America Online (visited Oct. 9, 1999)
<www.aol.com>. America Online provides chat rooms and
personalized information regarding local weather, movie list-
ings, news and sports in addition to access to the internet and
email accounts. See id.
180 See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at § 1.04[1].
181 See, e.g., Rotf Online Services (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<www.rotfl.com> (offering free email and two megabytes of
web space for individual web pages); Geocities (visited Oct. 13,
1999) <geocities.yahoo.com/home> (offering eleven
megabytes of disk space for individual websites and tools to
design websites without cost).
popular websites with advertisements advocating
for their candidate. 184
On September 14, 1999, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed a bill reforming the FECA.
18 5
Congressman Tom DeLay introduced an amend-
ment to the bill that sought to exempt all internet
activity from regulation. 186 The amendment was
defeated by a 160-268 vote. 18 7 Congressman De-
Lay's amendment to the bill was misguided. De-
Lay's approach would subvert the purpose of fed-
eral election laws, which attempt to "limit the
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions."' 8
Congressman Tom Allen said in opposition to
Congressman DeLay's amendment,
The Internet is growing at an exponential rate. Con-
gress thus far has taken a hands-off policy to let the In-
ternet grow and flourish. The DeLay amendment, how-
ever, could undermine the freedom of the Internet by
making it the favored conduit for special interests to
fund soft money and stealth issue ads into federal cam-
paigns. Let us not poison the Internet and poison our
democracy with this poison pill. 18 9
A categorical exemption for internet expendi-
tures would allow wealthy political committees
and candidates to saturate the web with advertise-
ments and fund-raising websites, gouging a giant
loophole through which campaign expenditures
may flow freely and without disclosure. However,
narrowly calculating the cost of creating an in-









See Advisory Opinion 1995-9, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
(CCH) 6146, 12055.
See id.
See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. H8250 (daily ed. Sept. 14,
See H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999).
See 145 CONG. REC. H8250, H8255. The amendment
read,
Section 330. (a) In General-Except as provided in sub-
section (b), none of the limitations, prohibitions, or re-
porting requirements of this Act shall apply to any activ-
ity carried out through the use of the Internet or to any
information disseminated through the Internet. (b) Ex-
ception-Subsection (a) shall not apply to the solicita-
tion or receipt of contributions. (c) Internet defined-
The term 'Internet' means the international computer
network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable
packet-switched data networks.
Id.
187 See id. at H8260.
188 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
189 145 CONG. REC. H8250, H8256.
[Vol. 8
Independent Expenditures on the Internet
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the internet does not represent the
answer to our problem-ridden campaign finance
laws, it presents a new tool with which individuals
may voice their opinion and attempt to influence
elections without the need for heavily funded
political committees. As a matter of policy, it is
wise to give breathing space to political activity on
the internet. Although our notions of the in-
ternet's impact and implications may change over
time, prudence dictates a "hands off' approach to
political activity on the internet at this time. It is
better to err on the side of free political speech
on the internet than to quash a flourishing me-
dium through which all participating may be
heard.
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